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ABSTRACT 
Since the Gulf War of 1991, United States military satellite communication 
(SATCOM) bandwidth demand has increased dramatically, as evidenced by recent usage 
rates in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Department of 
Defense (DoD) has increasingly relied on commercial vendors to meet this demand.  
With an open-ended Global War on Terror and heavy reliance on bandwidth-intensive 
operations (such as unmanned aerial vehicle feeds), the demand is projected to continue 
increasing at huge levels.  It is unlikely that reliance on commercial SATCOM will 
decrease, despite numerous planned military SATCOM assets launching over the next ten 
years.  While commercial SATCOM is essential to most military operations and provides 
many advantages, its pervasive use also raises concerns related to security, cost, and 
survivability.     
This thesis analyzes the balance between DoD use of commercial SATCOM 
versus military SATCOM.  It surveys historical and current military usage of DoD and 
commercial SATCOM, evaluates current predictions for military use of commercial 
SATCOM, and describes measures of effectiveness that can be used to evaluate the 
various SATCOM options.  In culmination, this thesis defines what constitutes an 
appropriate balance of military and commercial SATCOM usage using cost, technical, 
and policy compliance measures of effectiveness.  The measures of effectiveness lead to 
a recommendation of a more deliberate, less ad hoc use of commercial SATCOM for the 
vast majority of military SATCOM needs. 
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Since the Gulf War of 1991, satellite communication (SATCOM) bandwidth 
demands by the United States military services have increased over 500% by some 
measures and the Department of Defense (DoD) has increasingly relied on commercial 
vendors to meet this demand.  Approximately 80% of military satellite communications 
in the first two years of Operation Iraqi Freedom were provided by commercial satellites.  
With an open-ended Global War on Terror and heavy reliance on bandwidth intensive 
operations (such as unmanned aerial vehicle feeds), the demand is projected to continue 
increasing at significant levels.  It is unlikely that reliance on commercial SATCOM will 
decrease dramatically, despite launching numerous planned military SATCOM assets 
over the next ten years.  While commercial SATCOM is essential to most military 
operations and provides many advantages, its pervasive use also raises technical, 
financial, and policy concerns. 
This thesis analyzes the balance between DoD use of commercial versus military 
satellite communications.  It surveys military usage of DoD and commercial SATCOM, 
explores current predictions of future military use of commercial SATCOM, and presents 
measures of effectiveness used to evaluate the various SATCOM options.  In 
culmination, this thesis attempts to define what constitutes an appropriate balance of 
military and commercial SATCOM usage through exploration of the various options 
available compared against defined measures of effectiveness. 
The concluding recommendations of this study are that a 
MILSATCOM/commercial SATCOM mix with an emphasis on commercial SATCOM 
in all feasible cases provides the optimal balance based on technical, cost, and policy-
compliance measures of effectiveness.  This approach requires a long-term financial and 
strategic commitment as well as substantial cooperation between government and 
industry.  Failure to make this shift risks non-compliance with current U.S. National 
Space Policy and continuation of a non-optimal solution.  Several areas for further study 
are also recommended, including analyzing bandwidth reduction measures, and exploring 
more cost-effective alternatives to SATCOM. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Context 
In 1991, Operation Desert Storm ushered in a new era of warfare, which became 
commonly referred to as “the first space war.”  It was the first major military operation to 
make heavy use of the Global Positioning System (GPS), high resolution satellite 
imagery, and satellite communications (SATCOM).  Since then, while the Department of 
Defense (DoD) has remained relatively self-sufficient in the areas of navigation and 
imagery, the demand for SATCOM bandwidth has exploded far beyond the military’s 
ability to satisfy it with DoD-owned satellites.  According to a Joint Chiefs of Staff 
document, the need for bandwidth in a theater of war will grow to 14 Gbps by 2010, 
compared to 0.7 Gbps during the Operation Enduring Freedom (2001/2002) (Chisholm, 
2003).   
The military is struggling to develop and launch satellites to meet this growing 
need, but has experienced numerous schedule slips for a myriad of reasons ranging from 
technical difficulties, subcontractor quality issues, unstable funding, and launch vehicle 
integration troubles.  The Wideband Gapfiller Satellite (WGS) program, now renamed 
Wideband Global SATCOM since it has grown beyond its original “temporary” 
intention, was originally scheduled for launch in 2004, but slipped over three years 
despite a firm-fixed price contract vehicle that heavily incentivized early launch.  WGS’s 
“protected” (i.e., hardened, nuclear-survivable) counterpart, Advanced Extremely High 
Frequency (AEHF) recently announced its own latest round of launch slips.  
Transformational SATCOM (TSAT) was originally projected to “remove comm as a 
constraint to the warfighter” starting in 2012; the current first launch estimate is 2018.  At 
this time, the very future of TSAT is precarious; at a minimum, the program is likely to 
be financially gutted and delayed.   
 2
The launch delays of organic military communication satellites, combined with 
burgeoning operational needs, have caused the military to increasingly rely on 
commercial SATCOM.  Commercial sources accounted for approximately 60 percent of 
SATCOM provided in Operation Enduring Freedom and 80 percent during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (Chisholm, 2003).  WGS and AEHF may mitigate this trend, but will 
hardly reverse it.     
Operational need is not the only factor driving the DoD toward commercial 
SATCOM; the current U.S. National Space Policy essentially directs it.  On August 31, 
2006, President George W. Bush authorized a new national space policy that “establishes 
overarching national policy that governs the conduct of U.S. space activities.”  Most 
relevant to military SATCOM concerns was paragraph 7 (Commercial Space 
Guidelines), which stated, “It is in the interest of the United States to foster the use of 
U.S. commercial space capabilities around the globe and to enable a dynamic, domestic 
commercial space sector.  To this end, departments and agencies shall: Use U.S. 
commercial space capabilities and services to the maximum practical extent; purchase 
commercial capabilities and services when they are available in the commercial 
marketplace and meet United States Government requirements; and modify commercially 
available capabilities and services to meet those United States Government requirements 
when the modification is cost effective.”  Coupled with the operational need, this policy 
buttresses the DoD’s strong need to rely on commercial SATCOM for the foreseeable 
future.  This policy links back to the overarching principles in the same document: “The 
United States is committed to encouraging and facilitating a growing and entrepreneurial 
U.S. commercial space sector.”  The message is clear: unless there is a national security 
or compelling practical reason, use U.S. commercial sources for military SATCOM. 
2. Definitions  
To understand the issues presented and analyzed in this thesis, it is helpful to 
define certain terms explicitly.  Per American National Standard (ANS) T1.523-2001, 
Telecom Glossary 2000, satellite communications (SATCOM), is defined as the 
telecommunication service provided by one or more satellite relays and their associated 
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uplinks and downlinks.  SATCOM can be provided from satellites in different orbit types 
(geostationary; Molniya and other elliptical orbits; and low Earth orbits, both polar and 
non polar), each of which provides unique advantages and disadvantages.  The military 
generally categorizes SATCOM assets as wideband, narrowband (also tactical or 
mobile), or protected (also nuclear-protected); these terms are defined below and 
generalized further in Table 1.  
• Wideband: “Users of the wideband segment primarily have fixed and 
transportable land-based terminals; a few have terminals on large ships or 
aircraft. Their data rates vary from moderate to high, and their connectivity 
may be point-to-point or networked at distances ranging from in-theater to 
intercontinental”  (Martin, 2001).  
• Narrowband: “Users in the mobile-and-tactical segment of the architecture are 
characterized by small terminals with relatively low-gain antennas; they are 
located on ships, aircraft, and land vehicles. Data rates are low to moderate, 
and connectivity is typically in networks at distances ranging from in-theater 
to transoceanic” (Martin, 2001). 
• Protected: “Mobility characterizes users of the protected segment of the 
MILSATCOM architecture, whether they are on ships, aircraft, or land 
vehicles. They accept very low to moderate data rates in exchange for 
considerable protection of their links against physical, nuclear, and electronic 









 Wideband Narrowband Protected 
General Functions High data rate 
communication for 
fixed sites 
Voice; low-rate data; 




Data Rates High Low Varies (Low to Moderate) 
Power Requirements High Low Varies 
Mobile No Yes Varies 
Antenna Size Large Small Varies 
Protection Low to Moderate Low to Moderate High 
Frequencies  SHF/EHF VHF/UHF Varies 
Table 1.   Characteristics of Wideband, Narrowband, and Protected Satellites 
Commercial SATCOM, sometimes termed C-SATCOM to contrast it with organic 
MILSATCOM, can be either wideband or narrowband, but there is no “protected” 
commercial SATCOM at this time or in the foreseeable future.  Figure 1 below depicts 
the frequency spectrum from Very High Frequency (VHF) to Extremely High Frequency 
(EHF) with corresponding commercial and military satellites on the top and bottom, 
respectively (Goeller, 2004).  As seen, commercial SATCOM exists in proximity to 
military frequencies, although not in military frequencies, across the entire spectrum.  
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Figure 1.   SATCOM Spectrum Chart 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the balance between DoD use of 
commercial versus military SATCOM.  It surveys military usage of DoD and commercial 
SATCOM, explores current predictions of future military use of commercial SATCOM, 
and presents measures of effectiveness used to evaluate the various SATCOM options.  
In culmination, this thesis attempts to define what constitutes an appropriate balance of 
military and commercial SATCOM usage through exploration of the various options 
available compared against defined measures of effectiveness. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Following are the research questions that will be addressed in this thesis. 
1.  How has the DoD balanced use of commercial and military SATCOM since 
Operation Desert Storm? 
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2.  What trends will affect future military use of commercial and military 
SATCOM? 
3.  What options exist to strike the appropriate balance between military 
SATCOM and commercial SATCOM? 
4.  Which of these options are recommended based on the measures of 
effectiveness as defined in the thesis?  
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This thesis captures the history of military commercial SATCOM usage, provides 
a basis of knowledge for future SATCOM requirements analysis, and may aid in planning 
for future systems. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses the following methodology: 
1.  Conduct literature review of military use of SATCOM, to include historical, 
current, and predicted use; existing analysis of advantages/disadvantages of commercial 
SATCOM; and past research regarding the optimization of balancing military and 
commercial SATCOM. 
2.  Review the current DOD and service policies and guidance for SATCOM. 
3.  Solicit current and projected future usage data primarily from DISA, among 
other sources. 
4.  Interview subject matter experts for their perspectives on the research 
questions of this thesis. 
5.  Develop measures of effectiveness based on the most significant overall 
factors.  
6.  Correlate information gathered to develop options and recommendations for 
the appropriate balance between military and commercial SATCOM usage based on 
measures of effectiveness.  
 7
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter II briefly looks at 
the history of military SATCOM use, focusing specifically on the dramatic contrast 
between Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.  Chapter 
III moves past the historical examples to look at present and future SATCOM use.  It 
begins with an exploration of the current policies and organizations associated with 
SATCOM.  The remainder of the chapter describes the present supply and demand 
issues.  Chapter IV explores technical, cost, and policy measures of effectiveness.  
Chapter V weighs the measures of effectiveness against the various SATCOM options 
available to the government.  The culmination of the previous sections, Chapter VI 
presents the recommendation for striking the appropriate balance between military 
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II. COMMERCIAL SATCOM USE - PAST AND PRESENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The origins of military satellite communication reach back to the late 1940s, when 
the U.S. Army made radar contact with the moon.  In the decade following, the Navy 
conducted communications experiments using the moon as a reflector and used this 
technology in 1959 to establish a communication link between Hawaii and Washington, 
D.C. (Martin, 2001).  However, the real birth of military satellite communication, beyond 
experimental purposes, occurred in the mid-sixties with the launch and operational use of 
what became know as the Initial and Advanced Defense Communication Satellite 
Program.  In the 1970s, the DoD began the trinity of wideband/narrowband/protected 
communications: (1) the enduring Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) 
began supporting wideband requirements, (2) Fleet Satellite Communications System 
(FLTSATCOM) was launched to provide operational narrowband communications, and 
(3) the protected constellation Air Force Satellite Communications System 
(AFSATCOM) became operational in 1979 (Martin, 2007).   
The balance between “military SATCOM versus commercial SATCOM” is an old 
debate.  The early 1960s saw policy debates on whether there should be separate military 
communication satellites or if military requirements could be met with commercial 
systems.  Even then, the answer was a hybrid: yes; the military would establish and 
maintain a distinct communication satellite network to satisfy its unique needs, but 
decision makers also provided direction for the military to use commercial links if the 
requirements could be satisfied in a timely manner at a reasonable cost.  Later, in 1976 
and 1977, Congress directed the military to increase its use of leased commercial satellite 
services.  This direction was specifically applied to the narrowband follow-on to 
FLTSATCOM, resulting in the Leasat program, which primarily served the Navy but also 
some mobile users of the other services.  As Leasat approached end-of-life, the pendulum 
swung back towards organic military SATCOM; the narrowband sequel to Leasat was the 
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Navy-managed Ultra High Frequency Follow-On (UFO) (Martin, 2001).  The next 
pendulum swing would come immediately after Operation Desert Storm. 
B. HISTORICAL SNAPSHOTS 
1. SATCOM in 1991 – Operation Desert Storm  
Prior to Desert Storm, the utility of space capabilities in warfare was largely 
theoretical for the DoD, there having been no major U.S. military conflict since Viet 
Nam, which ended just as modern SATCOM was entering maturity.  Desert Storm 
changed everything; in the words of General Kutyna, Commander in Chief for Space 
during the operation, it was “the first space applications war” (Day, 1996).  Intertheater 
narrowband SATCOM was provided by FLTSATCOM and a Leasat while intratheater 
wideband was provided by two DSCS satellites on station over the Indian Ocean  
(Kiernan, 1991).  “Reachback” SATCOM (from theater to the U.S.) was accomplished 
via FLTSATCOM satellites over the Atlantic and DSCS satellites over the Eastern 
Atlantic, providing a vital link between CENTCOM and CONUS (Military Space, 1990).  
Meanwhile commercial sources provided approximately 20% of Desert Storm SATCOM 
(Snodgrass, 2007).  In the HQ AFSPACECOM Desert Storm “Hot Wash” report written 
immediately following the conflict, one of the lessons learned was titled SATCOM 
Indispensable.  The write-up described SATCOM providing 80% of theater 
communications (both inter and intra) and emphasized that SATCOM requirements, as 
required at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, had been significantly 
underestimated (Air Force Space Command, 1991).   
Desert Storm set the benchmark for SATCOM use.  Nearly twenty years later, the 
question is still asked, “How does that compare to Desert Storm?”  Desert Storm 
SATCOM usage was a mere 1 Mbps per 5000 troops.  As described in detail in the next 
section, modern usage seems enormous by contrast, spurred on in large part by the 
emergence of network-centric warfare.  
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2. Reforms Following Operation Desert Storm 
Immediately following Desert Storm, Congress directed the DoD to explore 
increased use of commercial SATCOM.  The fiscal year 1992 Defense appropriation 
provided $15 million for the DoD “to study ways of using commercial communication 
satellite capabilities” and “begin moving aggressively toward maximum utilization of 
commercial satellite communications systems” (GAO, 1994).  This mandate to make 
greater military use of commercial SATCOM was the first of its kind since 1977. 
The outgrowth of this congressional direction was the Commercial Satellite 
Communications Initiative (CSCI).  Providing the framework for the department’s effort 
to integrate commercial SATCOM capabilities, CSCI policy stated that the DoD will 
“augment” its military SATCOM capability with both domestic and international 
commercial services to the extent operationally and fiscally practical (U.S. Army 
Information Systems Engineering Command, 1998).  Primary responsibility for 
implementing this policy fell on the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), 
whose role will be elaborated on later in this section. 
3. SATCOM in 2003 – Operation Iraqi Freedom 
The next major turning point for military SATCOM use came in Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001/2002, quickly followed by the even larger 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.  As seen in Table 2, the total SATCOM used in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, at the time the data was captured in 2003, was well over twenty 
times what it had been in Operation Desert Storm, a war in the same region just over ten 
years earlier.  This increase is even more dramatic when one considers that the force size 
in Operation Iraqi Freedom was less than half what it was in Operation Desert Storm.  If 
one analyzes the data on a “per 5000 military member” basis, the SATCOM bandwidth 
increase was fifty-fold (Rayermann, 2003).  The causes of this growth are described in 




 Operation Desert Storm Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Total SATCOM Used (Mbps) 100 2,400 
Total Force Engaged 500,000 235,000 
Number of 5,000 Military Member Force 
Increments [i.e. brigades] 
100 47 
SATCOM Used per 5,000 Military 
Members (Mbps) 
1 51.1 
Table 2.   Increasing Demand for SATCOM since 1990 (Rayermann, 2003) 
Given this enormous increase in theater bandwidth requirements for the operation, 
it is no surprise that MILSATCOM alone could not meet the full need and that 
commercial SATCOM was heavily relied upon.  Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, there 
were five commercial SATCOM terminals in theater for tactical purposes; during the 
early months of the operation, there were 34.  This constitutes a 560% increase.  For this 
same period, military SATCOM terminals increased from 20 to 44, a 120% increase 
(USCENTAF, 2003).  This contrast underscores the military’s practical reliance on 
commercial SATCOM as a surge capability. Another telling statistic is the frequently 
repeated fact that roughly 80 percent of the SATCOM capacity needed for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom was provided by commercial space assets (Helfgott, 2005).  This is a 
complete reversal of the SATCOM balance in Operation Desert Storm. 
 
Figure 2.   Comparison of SATCOM Balance (1991/2003) 
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4. Reforms Following Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Just as Operation Desert Storm served as a wake-up call to legislators regarding 
DoD dependence on SATCOM and the need to rely on commercial SATCOM, Operation 
Iraqi Freedom experiences sent the message to legislators that DoD use of commercial 
SATCOM was inefficient.  In December 2003, less than nine months after the war began, 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a key report calling for the 
DoD to improve the planning and procurement of commercial SATCOM used by the 
military (Helfgott, 2005).  The GAO report, titled “Satellite Communications: Strategic 
Approach Needed for DoD's Procurement of Commercial Satellite Bandwidth” made the 
following points: 
• DoD was the largest consumer of commercial fixed satellite services. 
• DoD was buying its satellite services on an as-needed basis, thereby 
missing significant opportunities to leverage its buying power and to 
achieve considerable savings as a result. 
• Some users viewed the process for acquiring commercial fixed satellite 
services as being too lengthy, particularly for time-critical military 
operations, and they believed that the cost was too high. 
• DoD did not know exactly how much it was spending on commercial 
satellite services, nor did it know much about its service providers or 
whether customer needs were really being satisfied. 
• Neither DoD nor DISA were collecting aggregated forecasts of users’ 
needs for commercial fixed satellite services, which is an important step 
toward optimizing DoD’s spending. 
• GAO’s recommendations to DoD focused on the need to develop and 
implement a strategic approach to acquire commercial satellite services, 
along with correcting specific oversight and management weaknesses. 
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While the GAO report provided ammunition for those who said that commercial 
SATCOM costs “too much”, the report also paved the way for significant cost savings 
through reforms and would ultimately make commercial SATCOM a more cost-effective 
solution for meeting operational and policy requirements.  As a result of these findings, 
Congress directed the DoD to submit a report on military guidance for this subject and an 
explanation of how the guidance addresses GAO’s recommendations.  Like CSCI in the 
1990s, the GAO report was a major turning point for SATCOM and, combined with the 
U.S. National Space Policy of 2006, may well have significant implications for 
MILSATCOM in the decades to come. 
C. PRESENT STATE 
1. Progress since 2003 GAO Report   
Subsequent to the December 2003 GAO Report, significant DoD process 
improvements were made.  In response to the report, the DoD issued in December 2004 a 
policy memorandum for the planning, acquisition, and management of commercial 
satellite communications fixed satellite services, published an action plan for 
implementing new policy, defined baseline requirements for commercial satellite 
communication services, and completed cost-benefit analysis.  DoD submitted a response 
report to Congress on 29 July 2005.  In the report to Congress, the DoD defined how it 
was planning to implement a more strategic approach for the planning, acquisition, and 
management of commercial fixed satellite services.  The report also discussed the 
findings of the GAO report and described four elements for DoD’s new strategic 
approach for commercial fixed satellite services: 
1. Integrated planning; 
2. Cost-effective acquisition and effective provisioning; 
3. Integrated management of commercial and military operations; and 
4. Alignment of commercial and military satellites and earth equipment. 
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The 2003 GAO report provided seven specific options that could improve the 
DoD’s practices in leveraging its buying power.  A follow-up GAO report in 2005 
provided status on each of these seven areas, as detailed in Table 3.  As can be observed, 
two of the recommendations were fully addressed and five were at least partially 
addressed. 
RECOMMENDATION Extent Addressed 
1. Inventory current and potential users of commercial bandwidth to determine 
existing and long term requirements 
Fully addressed 
 
2. Identify and exploit consolidation opportunities for bandwidth requirements of 
combatant commanders, military services, and defense agencies 
Partially addressed 
 
3. Adopt, when appropriate, commonly used commercial practices, such as  
conducting spending analyses and negotiating pricing discounts based on overall 
DoD volume, to strengthen DoD’s position in acquiring bandwidth 
Partially addressed 
4. Improve the current funding structure by considering new funding approaches, 
such as centralized funding of commercial bandwidth and seeking legislative 
authority for multiyear procurements. 
Fully addressed 
 
5. Develop performance metrics to assess user satisfaction with the timeliness, 
flexibility, quality, and cost in acquiring commercial satellite services. 
Partially addressed 
 
6. Strengthen DoD’s capacity to provide accurate and complete analyses of 
commercial bandwidth requirements, spending, and the capabilities of commercial 




7. Assess, and implement as needed, changes to the key elements of the existing 
acquisition process—including requirements generation, solution development and 
evaluation, and contract vehicles—to facilitate a more strategic approach. 
Partially addressed 
 
Table 3.    Status of Recommendations from 2003 GAO Report  
Commercial SATCOM services provided through DISA were tangibly more 
timely and cost-effective for the warfighter.  For example, DISA now leverages 
competition and DoD’s buying power via their DSTS-G contract to acquire commercial 
SATCOM at approximately 25% below market average for the same service.  In certain 
cases, DISA’s Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) Satellite Transmissions 
Services-Global (DSTS-G) pricing is nearly 50% cheaper than available GSA pricing.  




percent.  Also, through their Six Sigma and Lean process improvements, DISA reports 
that requirement identification-to-award cycle time has been reduced by 73%--see Figure 
3 (Mansir, 2005). 
 
Figure 3.   DISA RFS-to-Award Time Reduction (Mansir, 2005) 
2. Commercial SATCOM Procurement Organizations  
To better convey current and future commercial SATCOM procurement 
processes, this section will describe the various organizations involved in Fixed Satellite 
Service (FSS) and Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) procurement.  At the highest DoD 
level below the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) Joint Staff J6, United States 
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is designated at the SATCOM Operations 
Manager (SOM).  As seen in Figure 4, in this capacity USSTRATCOM interfaces with 
various organizations, from combatant commanders to the commercial satellite industrial 
base.  One critical relationship depicted is that with DISA, whom the Commander, 
USSTRATCOM, has designated as the Commercial Satellite System Expert (SSE) for 
fixed and mobile satellite services.  A significant part of USSTRATCOM’s role in 
commercial SATCOM is providing guideline, publicity, and operational prioritization to 
DISA, the day-to-day executer of commercial SATCOM procurement efforts. 
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Figure 4.   SOM Relationships (Snodgrass, 2007) 
DISA is the DoD’s only authorized service provider for commercial fixed and 
mobile satellite services.  A significant part of the reason for having a sole DoD provider 
is to capitalize on the collective buying power of the DoD.  In the past, even when the 
DoD was the largest SATCOM customer, it bought like 300 small customers instead of 
pooling together its significant purchasing power (Snodgrass, 2007).  Purchasing 
discounted leases as a single entity with “most favored customer” status drives down cost 
and improves operationally prioritized responsiveness from the vendor. 
 To procure commercial SATCOM, the front line DISA organization is the 
Commercial Satellite Team (CST) within the Center for Network Services.  The CST is 
“the principal facilitator for the planning, acquisition, engineering, and management of 
commercial wideband and mobile SATCOM goods and services.  CST provides the 
interface between the customer, the contracting agencies, and the commercial vendors. 
The principal mechanisms for acquiring wideband goods and services are the DSTS-G 
contract and various Defense Information Technology Contracting Organization 
(DITCO) contracts through the DITCO on-line ordering process for mobile SATCOM 
goods and services” (DISA, 2008).   
 18
3. Commercial SATCOM Service Request Process 
Using wideband as an example, the current process for procuring commercial 
SATCOM begins with the user identifying the need.  From there, he or she contacts the 
Regional SATCOM Support Center (RSSC) and asks to speak with a CST representative; 
if no RSSC is identified, then the user contacts the CST directly.  The CST representative 
can provide technical guidance, cost estimates, and advice on filling out the required 
documentation.  The formal process, however, begins with the Request for Service 
(RFS); complicated requests may require more elaborate documentation.  From there, the 
customer’s work is largely done from the procurement perspective, though as seen in 
Figure 5, DISA has multiple steps to accomplish before service can be provided.  
Currently, DISA estimates between 21 and 45 days to complete the process, depending 
on the complexity of the request.  While this may sound lengthy to the requester, the 
process is restrained by necessary legal steps yet remains a substantial improvement of 
the 79-day median RFP-to-award time prior to the reforms made since 2004. 
 
Figure 5.   Commercial Satellite Team Acquisition Process (Mansir, 2005) 
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4. Commercial SATCOM Procurement Policies and Guidance 
Commercial SATCOM procurement is guided by various policies at various 
levels.  Current key policies and guidance pertaining to commercial SATCOM include: 
• Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration): DoD 
Policy for Procuring Mobile Satellite Services, dated 29 August 2001  
o Provides high-level guidance for narrowband / mobile commercial 
SATCOM 
• Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration): 
Policy for Planning, Acquisition, and Management of Commercial Satellite 
communications Fixed Satellite Services,  dated 14 Dec 2004 
o Provides High-level guidance for wideband / fixed commercial 
SATCOM 
• Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6250.01B, Satellite 
Communications, 28 May 2004 
o Provides policy on the requesting and procurement of commercial 
SATCOM 
• SATCOM Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), 14 August 2004 
o Describe the overarching required capabilities and desired effects for a 
SATCOM family of systems 
• DISA CIRCULAR 310-130-5, 30 July 2002 
o At a more detailed level than the above documents, this circular 
provides instructions for the preparation and submission of requests 
for telecommunications in support of the departments, agencies, and 
offices of the DoD and other U.S. Government agencies authorized by 
the Secretary of Defense to contract for service through DISA 
• DISA Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DARS), September 2003 
o Supplements the Federal Acquisition Regulations, providing rules and 
guidance for procurement of commercial SATCOM. 
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More recently, and at a higher level than any of the above documents, President 
George W. Bush authorized on August 31, 2006 a new U.S. National Space Policy 
(White House, 2006).  A sweeping document affecting all U.S. space endeavors, one of 
the many fundamental goals of the policy was to “Enable a dynamic, globally 
competitive domestic commercial space sector” (White House, 2006).  In paragraph 
seven, the policy elaborated on this principle: “It is in the interest of the United States to 
foster the use of U.S. commercial space capabilities around the globe and to enable a 
dynamic, domestic commercial space sector. To this end, departments and agencies shall 
use U.S. commercial space capabilities and services to the maximum practical extent; 
purchase commercial capabilities and services when they are available in the commercial 
marketplace and meet United States Government requirements; and modify commercially 
available capabilities and services to meet those United States Government requirements 
when the modification is cost effective” (White House, 2006). 
The National Space Policy’s “to the maximum extent possible” direction is a 
much higher standard than the “augmentation” language of the SATCOM ICD and other 
preceding documents of policy and guidance.  It remains to be seen how USSTRATCOM 
policy will adjust to fit the new National Space Policy tone.  One important nuance of the 
language is “use U.S. commercial space capabilities and services to the maximum 
practical extent.”  As shown in section III of this thesis, very few SATCOM providers are 
purely U.S., thus strict adherence to the new policy may have little practical effect—there 
are not enough exclusively U.S. companies to fill the need. 
D. SUMMARY 
Having surveyed the past and present of the military commercial SATCOM use, 
the dynamic and challenging nature of meeting SATCOM demand should be apparent.  
This chapter described the tremendous growth in SATCOM requirements between 
Operation Desert Storm and Operations Iraqi Freedom.  It described the processes and 
policies during this critical period of growth.  Of significant interest was the SATCOM 
procurement improvements spurred on by the 2003 GAO report.  This thesis turns now to 
the future, exploring projected military SATCOM demand and the corresponding supply 
from both military and commercial sources. 
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III. SATCOM’S FUTURE - DEMAND AND SUPPLY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The DoD’s fundamental SATCOM challenge for the coming decades is 
essentially one of supply and demand, although both are ever-fluctuating by regions 
based on world events.  This section will first describe the demand projections through 
2020 from multiple sources.  Second, this section will detail the various supply sources 
available to meet that demand, including both military and commercial SATCOM assets. 
B. SATCOM DEMAND 
Starting with Desert Storm, military bandwidth requirements during conflicts 
appear to be following the exponential growth that is often seen in depictions of Moore’s 
law.  SATCOM requirements are not merely increasing; they are increasing 
exponentially.  The convergence of network-centric warfare, data-driven systems, and 
user demands has created an insatiable demand for SATCOM.  The below figure depicts 
the bandwidth used per 5,000 military members in past, present, and future conflicts. 
 
Figure 6.   Growth in SATCOM Requirements (Rayermann, 2004) 
Figure 7 shows an estimate from an August 2004 draft of the SATCOM ICD 
indicates a similar trend, independent of the “per 5000 military members” benchmark, 
contrasted with projected shortfalls in required capacity. 
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Figure 7.   Notional Growing SATCOM Needs of DoD, IC, and NASA (Cartwright, 
2004) 
Figure 8 depicts the bandwidth requirement now along with the military and 
commercial supply sources.  As seen, there remains a significant gap of unmet 
requirements, which could further be exacerbated by additional uncertain growth.   
 
 
Figure 8.   Military Demand for SATCOM (Snodgrass, 2007) 
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It is possible these figures above overestimate the need.  For example, if Global 
War on Terror operations cease in the next few years and no other major operations occur 
through 2020, then yes—this model would likely result in an overestimation.  However, 
the role of the DoD is to prepare for war, not peace; a best-case scenario model would 
undermine responsiveness to real-world situations.  Furthermore, as U.S. Army 
Lieutenant Colonel Roy Snodgrass of USSTRATCOM/J663 pointed out at a recent 
LandWarNet conference, bandwidth requirements have been dramatically underestimated 
in every modern conflict (Snodgrass, 2007). 
Given the projected increased reliance on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), 
streaming video, and high-resolution imagery in warfare, there is presently no reason to 
think that such bandwidth requirement growth will slow down anytime in the next several 
decades.  The DoD has little choice but to plan for the current predictions, however 
daunting they may now appear. 
1. Causes 
Having examined the current predictions for future SATCOM requirements, it is 
worthwhile to explore to the causes of such dramatic growth.  In his Commercial 
SATCOM Support Current/Future presentation, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Roy 
Snodgrass of USSTRATCOM pinpoints the specific drivers for bandwidth growth.  The 
first cause of increased demand for SATCOM is “SATCOM to lower echelons,” meaning 
SATCOM need is not relegated to command centers but dispersed to nearly every solider 
and platform; in other words, almost no warfighter or system is untouched by network-
centric warfare (Snodgrass, 2007).  The second factor increasing demand is “SATCOM 
on the move,” the increased need for mobile communication in adverse conditions and 
with low-power terminals (Snodgrass, 2007).  A third driver is “Internet Protocol (IP) 
give and take,” meaning the technical implications of IP can limit the efficient use of the 
SATCOM bandwidth available (Snodgrass, 2007).  The fourth and final factor is 
arguably the most significant—high bandwidth applications: UAV uplinks and 
downlinks, streaming video, high-definition imagery, and weapon systems increasingly 
dependent on significant quantities of data (Snodgrass, 2007). 
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While the projections in Figure 6 are based on number of military personnel, 
“number of human beings” is hardly the most accurate barometer when discussing large 
bandwidth use.  One of the biggest reasons for the bandwidth surge is UAV.  In each 
successive operation depicted, UAV usage dramatically increased.  According to David 
Helfgott, president and chief executive officer of Americom Government Services, some 
UAVs need to transmit high-definition data at speeds that can exceed 45 megabits per 
second (Frederick, 2006).  This is for a single UAV—contrast that with the need for 500 
military members depicted in Figure 9 and then imagine the bandwidth demands of a fleet 
of UAVs.   
Predicting military bandwidth requirements is an art, not a science.  By the very 
nature of world events and politics, one cannot accurately predict contingencies and thus 
corresponding needs.  For example, U.S. Central Command required a mere 100 Mps in 
of commercial SATCOM in August 2001 (the month prior to 9/11) and then two billion 
bits per second (2 Gbps) in the winter of 2003 (Rayermann, 2004).  This twenty-fold 
increase in about two years was unprecedented and dramatic, but certainly illustrates the 
problematic nature of attempting to predict wartime bandwidth requirements in a 
peacetime environment.   
C. SATCOM SUPPLY 
Given these bandwidth projections, the DoD is left with a fundamental supply and 
demand challenge.  As the RAND report on the subject succinctly points out, there are 
three basic options (Bonds et al., 2000): 
A.  Limit demand so that it matches available bandwidth 
B.  Increase supply using DoD satellites 
C.  Increase supply using commercial satellites 
There is also a fourth option not discussed in the RAND report: attempting to 
fulfill bandwidth requirements using non-satellite resources.  Traditional means of 
fulfilling these requirements include exploiting temporary or permanent fiber solutions 
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when viable.  More innovative solutions include the use of high-altitude “near-space” 
balloons or extended flight communication UAVs.   
 Option A (“limit demand so that it matches available bandwidth”) is barely 
discussed in existing literature, perhaps partly for fear of implying that the warfighter is 
somehow using up precious bandwidth unnecessarily.  Given the dire gap between 
projected supply and demand, however, there is merit in exploring the (1) design and 
modification of ground and air systems reduce bandwidth usage and/or (2) institute 
policies restricting use based on mission priority.  However, such exploration is beyond 
the scope of this thesis and thus deferred to the “areas for further study” section.  This 
leaves options B and C which will be explored further in the remainder of this section. 
The roadmap for military SATCOM is relatively clear. 
 
 Deactivated On-Orbit Near-Term Long-Term 
Protected AFSATCOM Milsar AEHF TSAT 
Wideband DSCS II DSCS III, GBS WGS TSAT 
Narrowband FLTSATCOM UFO MUOS MUOS 
Table 4.   Roadmap for Military SATCOM 
  
The roadmap for commercial SATCOM remains less certain, as the DoD does not 
possess specific insight into market-driven commercial satellite development the way it 
does with the organic military assets.  However, for the foreseeable future, the three 













Satellite Service – 
FSS) 
• Intelsat 
• SES Global 
• Eutelsat 
• Loral Skynet 
Narrowband 
(a.k.a. Mobile 
Satellite Service – 
MSS) 
• Immarsat  
• Thuraya  
• Iridium  
• Globalstar 
Table 5.   Current Commercial SATCOM Constellations 
D. MILITARY SATCOM ON-ORBIT 
1. Milstar 
According to the official U.S. Air Force fact sheet, “Milstar is a joint service 
satellite communications system that provides secure, jam resistant, worldwide 
communications to meet essential wartime requirements for high priority military users.”  
The Milstar constellation consists of five operational satellites in geosynchronous orbits.  
The first Milstar launched in February 1994 and the last in April 2003.  Based on the 
10-year design life, global coverage from Milstar should begin degrading in the 2010 
time frame (Air Force Space Command, 2007). 
In the wideband/protected SATCOM dichotomy, Milstar is the only U.S. on-orbit 
“protected” communications satellite.  Among other characteristics, protected implies the 
ability to continue operations during and after a nuclear conflict.  In additional to the 
hardened architecture of the satellite itself, Milstar also achieves its protected status 
through use of geographically dispersed mobile and fixed ground control stations.   
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Figure 9.   Milstar Image (Air Force Space Command, 2007) 
 
Milstar General Characteristics 
Primary Function Protected global military communications 
Primary Contractor Lockheed Martin 
Weight 10,000 pounds 
Orbit altitude 22,250 nautical miles 
Launch vehicle Titan IVB/Centaur upper stage 
Inventory 5 operational 
Unit Cost $800 million 
Table 6.   Milstar Characteristics (Air Force Space Command, 2007) 
2. Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) III 
Since first launching in 1982, DSCS III became and remains the wideband 
“workhorse” of military SATCOM, providing nuclear-hardened, anti-jam, high data rate, 
long haul communications to users worldwide.  Due to recent end-of-life supersyncing, 
the DSCS constellation has shrunk to nine satellites, each providing super high frequency 
transponder channels capable of providing secure voice and high rate data 
communications.  Due to the DSCS history of dramatically outliving its design life, the 
constellation has the capability continue providing operational SATCOM even after the 
launch of all six projected WGS satellites, though it may not be cost-feasible.   
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Figure 10.   DSCS Image (Air Force Space Command, 2007) 
 
DSCS General Characteristics 
Primary Function Worldwide, long-haul communications 
Primary Contractor Lockheed Martin 
Weight 2,716 pounds 
Orbit altitude 19251 nautical miles 
Launch vehicle Atlas II and Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 
Inventory 9 
Unit Cost $200 million 
Table 7.   DSCS Characteristics (Air Force Fact Sheet, 2007) 
3. Ultra High Frequency Follow-On (UFO) 
As the narrowband MILSATCOM component, the UFO mission is to provide 
communications for airborne, ship, submarine, and ground forces.  While most 
MILSATCOM assets are procured by the U.S. Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems 
Center (SMC), UFO is acquired and managed by the U.S. Navy as a replacement to their 
Fleet Satellite Communications System (FLTSATCOM) constellation.  UFO provides 
nearly twice as many channels as FLTSATCOM and boasts about 10 percent more power 
per channel.  The first UFO launch occurred in March 1993 and the constellation will 
ultimately consist of 11 satellites.   
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Figure 11.   UFO Image (Navy Communications Satellite Programs, 1999) 
 
UFO General Characteristics 
Primary Function Narrowband communications for airborne, ship, submarine, and 
ground forces 
Primary Contractor Boeing 
Weight 2,610 – 3,371 pounds 
Orbit altitude Geosynchronous orbit - 17716 nautical miles 
Launch vehicle Atlas-Centaur space booster 
Inventory 11 
Table 8.   UFO Characteristics (Navy Communications Satellite Programs, 1999) 
4. Global Broadcast System (GBS) 
What could be termed “DirectTV for the warfighter,” DoD wideband asset GBS 
provides both classified and unclassified high data rate direct broadcast to military 
members worldwide.  Provided since 1996, GBS is not a satellite itself but rather a 






GBS General Characteristics 
Primary Function High-capacity broadcast (audio, video, files, web, common 
operating picture) 
Primary Contractor Raytheon 
Payload Transponded Ka/Ku-band communications suite 
Capability 96 Mbps per Ka satellite; 1.9 Terabytes to CENTCOM daily 
Host vehicle UFO satellites 8/9/10, Galaxy 10XR (CONUS) (Ku), Telestar 12 
(EUCOM AOR) (Ku) 
Inventory 3 Primary Injection Points, over 600 Receive Suites,  
5 Theater Injection Points 
Table 9.   GBS Characteristics (Air Force Space Command, 2007) 
E. MILITARY SATCOM FOR THE FUTURE 
1. Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) 
Managed by the U.S. Air Force and developed by Boeing, WGS is a 
geosynchronous wideband communications satellite based on a widely used the 
commercial 702 bus.  A successor to DSCS and GBS, it provides a huge leap in 
bandwidth capacity.  A single WGS satellite provides roughly the same bandwidth as an 
entire 12-satellite DSCS constellation.  While only three WGS satellites are required for 
“near-global” coverage (excluding the poles), an additional three have been contracted to 
provide additional capacity and extend total system life.  The first launch occurred 
successfully in October 2007, while the remaining five will launch periodically between 
2008 and 2013 (Air Force Space Command, 2007). 
 
Figure 12.   WGS Image (Air Force Space Command, 2007) 
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WGS General Characteristics 
Primary Function High-capacity military communications satellite 
Primary Contractor Boeing Satellite Systems 
Weight Approximately 13,000 pounds at launch, 7,600 pounds on-orbit 
Orbit altitude 19317 nautical miles 
Payload Transponded, cross-banded-X and Ka-band communications suite 
Antennas 8 beam, transmit and receive X-band Phased arrays and 10 Ka-band 
Gimbaled Dish Antennas, 1 X-band Earth coverage 
Capability 39 125-MHz Channels via digital channelizer/router 
Launch vehicle Delta IV and Atlas V EELVs 
Inventory 5 on contract, 1 more planned 
Unit Cost Approximately $300 million per satellite 
Table 10.   WGS Characteristics (Air Force Space Command, 2007) 
2. Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) 
The future of protected military SATCOM for the near future, AEHF “provides 
global, secure, protected, and jam resistant communications for high-priority military 
ground, sea, and air assets” (Air Force Space Command, 2007).  A replacement for 
Milstar, AEHF will provide over ten times the capability per satellite of its predecessor 
and incorporate more current survivable communications capability.  Though like most 
military space programs it has been plagued by launch slips, the first AEHF satellite is 
currently schedule for launch in late 2008, with a second and third to follow.  Recent 
discussions have also indicated the possibility of a fourth, fifth, and sixth AEHF satellite 
(Air Force Space Command, 2007). 
 
Figure 13.   AEHF Image (Air Force Space Command, 2007) 
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AEHF General Characteristics 
Primary Function Global, secure, survivable satellite communications 
Primary Contractor Lockheed Martin 
Weight Approximately 14,500 pounds at launch, 9,000 pounds on-orbit 
Orbit altitude 19317 nautical miles (geosynchronous) 
Capability Data rates from 75 bps to approximately 8 Mbps 
Launch vehicle Delta IV and Atlas V EELVs 
Inventory 3 satellites ordered 
Unit Cost Approximately $580 million per satellite 
Table 11.   AEHF Characteristics (Air Force Space Command, 2007) 
3. Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)  
The Navy’s replacement for the UFO constellation, MUOS provide global 
SATCOM narrowband (64 Kbps and below) connectivity for voice, video and data for 
the warfighter.  Still under development, Lockheed Martin was awarded a $2.1 billion 
contract to build the first two MUOS satellites and associated ground control segment.  
However, the constellation will ultimately consist of four operational satellites, plus one 
on-orbit spare.  The first MUOS satellite is scheduled for launch in late 2009, with Initial 
Operational Capability (IOC) declared in 2010.  
  
 







MUOS General Characteristics 
Primary Function Narrowband (64 Kbps and below) connectivity for mobile and 
deployed users 
Primary Contractor Lockheed Martin 
Weight 6800 pounds 
Orbit altitude 19323 nautical miles 
Table 12.   MUOS Characteristics (Lockheed Martin, 2008) 
 
4. Transformational SATCOM (TSAT) 
TSAT will “provide unprecedented satellite communications with Internet-like 
capability which will extend the DoD Global Information Grid (GIG) to deployed users 
worldwide and deliver an order of magnitude increase in capacity.”  Figure 15 below 
shows just how dramatic the improvement will be, highlighting dramatic improvements 
in the speedy delivery of Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) and imagery.  Characterized by 
high data rates and Internet-like routing protocols, TSAT is envisioned as a giant leap 
forward for MILSATCOM.  Another transformational ambition of TSAT is to be the 
single follow-on to both its wideband (WGS) and protected (AEHF) predecessors.  When 
this thesis began, the first TSAT launch was scheduled for late 2015, with Full 
Operational Capability (FOC) in 2019 (Air Force Space Command, 2007).   
 
Figure 15.   TSAT – SATCOM Capability Evolution (McKinney, 2007) 
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 TSAT should not be confused with the Transformation Communications 
Architecture (TCA), which is the overarching vision for next-generation military 
communications, emphasizing Internet Protocol (IP) driven interoperability as the enabler 
for new communication solutions.  TCA seeks to assure information dominance through 
improved, shared battlefield awareness; robustly networked GIG elements; time-critical 
targeting; and enhanced regulatory and spectrum coordination.  As Figure 16 depicts, 
TSAT is merely part of the TCA, albeit a significant one (Air Force Space Command, 
2007). 
 
Figure 16.   TCA Image (McKinney, 2007) 
 
TSAT General Characteristics 
Primary Function Space-based component of the GIG, extending its reach to deployed 
users 
Primary Contractor TBD 
Orbit  Geosynchronous 
Payload Protected high data rate EHF, K-band (receive only) RF and Laser 
payloads  
Launch vehicle Delta IV and Atlas V EELVs 
Inventory 5 
Table 13.   TSAT Characteristics (Air Force Space Command, 2007) 
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Despite the bold goals of TSAT, its challenges are numerous.  In addition to the 
usual space acquisition challenges of funding cuts and fluctuating political support, 
TSAT also has increased technical maturity challenges when compared to less ambitious 
programs such as WGS and AEHF.  Major Maurice McKinney argues in his thesis, 
Transformational Satellite (TSAT) Communications Systems Falling Short on Delivering 
Advanced Capabilities and Bandwidth to Ground-Based Users, that “advanced 
capabilities provided by TSAT are limited and will not be sufficient to serve the ground-
based portion of the communications network supporting network-centric warfare” 
(McKinney, 2007).  Lieutenant General William Shelton, commander of the 14th Air 
Force, agrees.  “I don’t think we’ll ever have enough bandwidth,” said Shelton in a 2007 
Air Force Magazine article. “There are some who said that TSAT is going to take away 
bandwidth as a constraint—I don’t think that will ever be true” (Hebert, 2007).   
F. COMMERCIAL SATCOM ASSETS 
This section describes a representative sample of the major commercial 
constellations commonly used to provide military SATCOM in various regions of the 
world.  A comprehensive list and detailed descriptions can be found in Communication 
Satellites (Fifth Edition), authored by Donald Martin, Paul Anderson, and Lucy 
Bartamian.  Since no protected SATCOM assets are available in the commercial market, 
the constellations have been generally categorized as either Fixed Satellite Service 
(comparable to wideband) or Mobile Satellite Service (comparable to narrowband). 
1. Fixed Satellite Service 
a. Intelsat 
Intelsat is the world’s largest commercial satellite communications 
services provider, owning and operating a fleet of 51 communications satellites at the 
time of the writing.  Its premier status was solidified in 2006 when it acquired long-time 
rival PamAmSat for $4.3 billion.  Intelsat has a strong international presence, with a 




Figure 17.   Intelsat Image (Space Flight Now, 2008) 
b. Loral Skynet (Telestar) 
Not to be confused with the U.K. military satellite Skynet, Loral Skynet is 
the fourth-largest fixed satellite services provider in the world.  It provides full-service 
global communications to a wide variety of customers, including HBO, Disney, Cable & 
Wireless, Singapore Telecom, Connexion by Boeing, Global Crossing, BT North 
America, Globecomm Systems, UPC and China Central Television.  While previously a 
New Jersey based company, the company’s recent merger with Canadian firm Telesat 
undermined the previously domestic nature of the company.  In mid-2007, Loral 
attempted, unsuccessfully, to acquire Intelsat (Martin, 2007). 
 
Figure 18.   Loral Skynet /Telestar Image (Space Mart, 2006) 
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c. SES Global 
The result of various mergers, SES Global was formed in 2001 and 
immediately became one of the largest satellite service companies in the world.  Its 
subsidiaries include SES Global Latin America, AsiaSat, and SES Sirius.  Though 
General Electric is one of the largest shareholders (at 20%), the company is international 
and based in based in Betzdorf, Luxembourg (Martin, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 19.   SES Global Image (Cains' News, 2006) 
d. Eutelsat 
One the three largest satellite operators in the world in terms of revenue, 
Eutelsat provides coverage of the entire European continent, plus the Middle East, Africa, 
India and significant parts of Asia and the Americas.  The company has approximately 20 
satellites on orbit, with immediate plans for several more.  While used primarily for 
television broadcast, it also provides corporate networks, mobile positioning and 
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communications, Internet backbone connectivity and broadband access for terrestrial, 
maritime and in-flight applications.  The company is based in France, with no major U.S. 
ownership (Martin, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 20.   Eutelsat Image (Space Flight Now, 1999) 
2. Mobile Satellite Service 
a. Iridium 
A massive Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellation, Iridium is comprised of 
66 operational satellites plus on-orbit and grounded spares.  The satellites are relatively 
light, at 1500 pounds, allowing multiple satellites to be launched at the same time (from 
two to seven depending on the launch vehicle).  Initially a colossal economic failure, 
Iridium began providing services in November 1998 and declared bankruptcy less than a 
year later.  The failure was due in part to mismanagement but primarily due to 
insufficient demand.  The high cost of calls from Iridium phones, ranging from $3 to $14 
per minute, no doubt discouraged many potential customers.  This U.S.-based company 
survived, in large part due to extensive use by the DoD.  Currently, the company is 
showing increases in subscribers and revenue (Martin, 2007). 
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Figure 21.   Iridium Image (Visual Satellite Observer, 2008) 
b. Inmarsat 
Growing out of an intergovernmental organization and now an 
international corporation, Inmarsat was founded in 1979 and today operates a 
constellation of approximately a dozen geosynchronous communications satellites.  Its 
worldwide coverage (excluding poles) provides traditional voice calls, low-level data 
tracking systems, high-speed data services, and distress/safety services (Martin, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 22.   Inmarsat Image (British National Space Centre, 2001) 
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c. Globalstar  
A LEO constellation similar to Iridium, Globalstar provides voice and 
low-speed data communications.  Also, like Iridium, Globalstar is a U.S.-based company 
which was only able to survive through filing bankruptcy, albeit several years later in 
2002.  More recently, the satellites have experienced technical problems resulting in 
numerous dropped calls, possibly due to satellite radiation exposure (Martin, 2007). 
 
Figure 23.   Globalstar Image (Sat News Daily, 2007) 
d. Thuraya 
Based in the United Arab Emirates, Thuraya is a smaller but 
geographically relevant constellation that provides mobile voice and low-rate data 
communications to Europe, Middle East, and Africa.  In the future, Thuraya tentatively 
plans to expand to East Asia, Australia and possibly South America.  The company has 
about a quarter million subscribers and has proved profitable in recent years.  The Middle 
Eastern nature of the service makes it both appealing and suspect for DoD use.  Currently 
there are two Thuraya satellites operational; the third is experiencing launch delays at the 




Figure 24.   Thuraya Image (Boeing, 2008) 
G. SUMMARY 
Having surveyed the military’s SATCOM supply and demand issues, it is 
apparent that a serious challenge is facing the DoD.  Present and future organic 
MILSATCOM clearly cannot meet the projected military demand.  Even adding 
commercial SATCOM to the equation, a supply and demand shortfall still appears to 
exist for the foreseeable future as depicted in Figure 8.  The next section will explore the 
advantages, disadvantages, and cost factors associated with commercial SATCOM.  With 
this foundation, the thesis will present and evaluate the options for striking the optimal 
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IV. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To reach the objective in the next section of defining the appropriate balance 
between military SATCOM and commercial SATCOM, it is critical to have clear and 
objective measures of effectiveness (MOE).  The MOE used in this thesis are: (1) 
technical, (2) cost, and (3) compliance with policy.  Each of these MOEs is described and 
explored in this section.     
B. TECHNICAL 
SATCOM technical MOEs are formally defined in the MILSATCOM ICD 
(Cartwright, 2004).  The following table details all five SATCOM Key Performance 
Parameters (KPPs): connectivity, information assurance, operations management, 
interoperability, and operational suitability. 
 
KPP Threshold Objective 
Coverage of users operating anywhere in the 
worldwide and North Polar areas is required.   
Coverage of users operating anywhere in the global 
coverage area is required.   
The SATCOM family of systems must provide 
satellite communications and data relay capacity to 
support the full range of projected DoD 
operations. 
Threshold plus each individual SATCOM system 
or service within the SATCOM family of systems 
should have the reserve capacity to accommodate 






Provide protected capacity1 to users and networks 
deemed most at risk to disruption of their 
SATCOM links with the protective features 
sufficient for them to operate as intended in their 
postulated threat environments. 
Provide protected capacity to all users and 
networks with the protective features sufficient for 






SATCOM systems and services must have the 
ability to avoid, prevent, negate, or mitigate the 
degradation, disruption, denial, unauthorized 
access or monitoring, and/or exploitation of 
sensitive and classified information that originates 
in, is conveyed by, or provided to them. 
SATCOM systems and services must have the 
ability to avoid, prevent, and/or negate the 
degradation, disruption, denial, unauthorized 
access or monitoring, and/or exploitation of 
sensitive and classified information that originates 





The Operational Management systems supporting 
the overall SATCOM family of systems and its 
constituent parts must provide platform, payload, 
and network management, monitoring, control, 
Objective equals threshold. 
                                                 
1 Capacity varies by satellite.  Exact values were not included in ICD reference document and some 
values may be classified.  
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and configuration capabilities to plan and perform 
spacecraft launch and early orbit (L&EO) 
activities, on-orbit operations, network support, 
and satellite disposal. 
The SATCOM FoS and its constituent systems 
must satisfy all of the top-level information 
exchange requirements designated critical in 
Appendix F of the ICD. 
The SATCOM family of systems and its 
constituent systems should satisfy all of the top-
level information exchange requirements identified 





OPERABILITY Interoperability must exist between and among the SATCOM networks of all operational elements 
(ground, air, special operations, maritime, 
intelligence, and support forces, to include Allies 
and coalition partners) with which they will form 
military or inter-agency mission task forces or 
otherwise be conducting operations. 




The various systems and services of the SATCOM 
family of systems must comply with the minimum 
performance standards of their intended user 
communities’ information systems.   
The various systems and services of the SATCOM 
family of systems must comply with objective 
performance standards of their intended user 
communities’ information systems.   
Table 14.   SATCOM Key Performance Parameters (Cartwright, 2004) 
Clearly, commercial SATCOM cannot meet all of these threshold and objectives 
presently or in the foreseeable future.  For example, the corporate world is unlikely to 
independently develop narrowband satellites capable of penetrating dense foliage (which 
requires non-commercial UHF allocation).  Nor is it likely companies would take the 
initiative to develop a nuclear-hardened communication satellite for any non-
governmental customer. 
However, there is no technical reason the military-unique requirements of the 
SATCOM ICD cannot be met by the private sector.  For example, a frequent objection to 
commercial SATCOM is that it limits users to commercial frequencies.  However, this 
need not be the case, as evidenced by XTAR’s recent development.  In Satellite Evolution 
Global, XTAR Chief Operating Officer (COO) Dr. Denis Curtin described his company’s 
flagship satellite constellation, which is “the world’s first commercial provider of X-band 
satellite services designed exclusively for government users.”  Could a private company 
build and operate satellites catering to both military and commercial frequencies?  
Absolutely—Dr. Curtin states that “the multi-frequency government/commercial hybrid 
model is a very efficient and cost-effective way of building a satellite system” (Satellite 
Evolution Global, 2006).   
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While it is unlikely that commercial SATCOM will autonomously build to the 
ICD parameters in the way that XTAR targeted government frequencies, there is no 
inherent reason why commercial companies could not build, launch, and operate satellites 
to meet these requirements provided long-term partnering and the proper incentives are 
provided.  This would require a dramatic paradigm shift in government dealings with 
commercial SATCOM providers.  Instead of waiting for the capabilities to be available, 
the government would need to actively partner with and financially commit to satellites 
prior to their development and launch.  Though put off by “partnering” in a shared 
management sense, commercial sources have responded very positively to early 
involvement in “anchor tenancy” arrangements in which the government would 
commitment to commercial satellite development in order to make it viable.  This is a 
very important principle to corporations which do not ordinarily commit to launching a 
new satellite until 75% of the capacity is pre-sold (Lacy, 2001).  In other words, the 
military would need to begin behaving more like a corporation in its SATCOM 
procurements—committing in advance of launch to long-term leases.  As seen in the next 
section, this is also an approach that could dramatically reduce cost. 
C. COST 
Though not specifically called out in the MILSATCOM ICD as a KPP, cost is 
clearly a major factor and one that merits independent discussion.  While one might 
expect cost to be the most quantifiable of the three MOEs, the variability and complexity 
actually makes objective cost comparison extremely difficult.  It cannot be simply stated 
that MILSATCOM is more expensive that commercial SATCOM (or vice versa).  The 
reality is… it depends.  Although attempts at cost comparisons have been made, 
Lieutenant Colonel Roy Snodgrass of USSTRATCOM/J663 poignantly observes that 
there are very few “pure” analyses to rely on and that commercial SATCOM lease costs 
have historically been high due to inefficient leasing practices (Snodgrass, 2007).  Thus 
technical compliance and policy compliance become simpler, almost binary, MOEs while 
cost as a MOE remains an unfortunate question mark. 
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1. Military SATCOM Costs 
Pricing the total lifecycle cost of a MILSATCOM satellite is nearly rocket science 
in itself.  Beyond the epidemic cost growth described later in this section, it is important 
to consider that the price touted by contractors and journalists is often the mere tip of the 
iceberg.  For example, AEHF satellites are generally mentioned in the press as having a 
under $600 million per unit price tag.  However, recent estimates of AEHF 4 are over 
double this amount, due largely to inefficiencies in the procurement schedule.  However, 
these “per satellite” estimates usually do not account for all development, sustainment, 
government overhead, and launch costs.  None of these additional amounts are trivial and 
combined they can eventually exceed even the cost of the satellite itself. 
For a current look at a relatively “simple” satellite (i.e., one with no low 
technology readiness level components and based on a proven COTS platform), 
Wideband Global SATCOM is an interesting example.  In mid-2007, the government had 
already contracted three WGS Block I satellites and was debating the size of the WGS 
Block II satellites.  In response, the WGS contractor Boeing provided an analysis 
comparing the cost of acquiring additional Wideband Global SATCOM satellites against 
the cost of leasing commercial transponders.  In this study, Boeing estimated that one 
additional WGS satellite would cost $640M over a 14-year lifecycle and that equivalent 
transponder leases would cost $2.7B.  In other words, commercial fixed satellite service 
transponder leasing is 400% more expensive that buying an additional WGS satellite! 
Beyond that, the document also cites numerous advantages such as superior security, 
steerable beams, and greater responsiveness (Boeing, 2007).  Based on such compelling 
arguments, the government has now not only funded three additional WGS satellites, but 
is also weighing the purchase of Block III satellites.  What was once a “gapfiller” now 
appears to be the future of wideband SATCOM for the next 25 years. 
However, WGS is almost entirely unique in being a firm-fixed price contract.  In 
the far more commonplace cost-plus satellite procurement contracts, the government 
bears the risk of escalating development costs and launch delays.  This is a huge risk and 
cost that cannot be trivialized.  As Captain Jeremiah Stahr points out in his 2006 thesis, A 
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Study On Improving United States Air Force Space Systems Engineering And 
Acquisition, the U.S. military “space systems acquisition process has increasingly 
become synonymous with exorbitant cost overruns, substantial schedule delays, and 
sometimes outright program failure” (Stahr, 2006).  In the 2005 Lexington Institute report 
titled Can The Space Sector Meet Military Goals For Space?, Loren B. Thompson places 
unplanned cost growth as the first of three factors that constitute “the biggest problems 
facing the national-security space sector” (Thompson, 2005). 
While the WGS versus lease SATCOM cost comparison presented above is 
relatively apples-to-apples, the same cannot be said of the protected SATCOM category.  
Narrowband and wideband are readily available in commercial equivalents, but there is 
no commercial parallel to systems such as Milstar and AEHF.  Even the most ardent 
advocates of military use of commercial SATCOM, such as Richard DalBello of Intelsat, 
takes “the relatively small amount of satellite traffic that demands the highest levels of 
protection” off the table in his 2007 editorial advocating greater military use of 
commercial SATCOM (DalBello, 2007). 
Finally, in reviewing estimates of MILSATCOM, it is also important to maintain 
a realistic degree of skepticism in light of historical cost growth.  One of the key findings 
of the Defense Science Board task force on acquisition of national-security space 
programs in 2003 was “the space acquisition system is strongly biased to produce 
unrealistically low cost estimates throughout the acquisition process”  (Thompson, 2005).  
Thus the typical cost-plus MILSATCOM contract is likely to grow in cost, whereas a 
contractual commercial SATCOM lease arrangement is generally a set cost not subject to 
the typical satellite acquisition cost growth.  Though not communication satellites, Space 
Based Infrared System High grew from $4 billion to over $10 billion and National Polar-
orbiting Operational Satellite System grew from $6 billion at inception to current 
estimates of over $11 billion (GAO, 2006).  For a SATCOM-specific example, consider 
that early estimates of AEHF were approximately $2.5 billion, a figure that grew to $5.3 
billion and is expected to grow further.  In the military satellite acquisition business, the 
doubling of costs appears to be more of the rule than the exception. 
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2. Commercial SATCOM Costs 
What is the cost of procuring commercial SATCOM?  The unfortunate answer is: 
it depends.  Like MILSATCOM, commercial SATCOM has also been the frequent target 
of “high cost” accusations.  Richard DalBello points out that “some senior military 
officials have stated publically that an investment in military broadband satellite is 
necessary to reduce reliance on ‘costly commercial satellite systems.’  Given what DoD 
has spent on its military satellites, however, this is a bit like hearing the owner of a 
garage full of Ferraris commenting on the high price of public transportation”  (DalBello, 
2007).  Despite this colorful defense, high commercial SATCOM costs have been a 
serious and legitimate concern of Congress, the GAO, and the DoD, particularly since 
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.   
The cost among commercial SATCOM service providers varies wildly.  For 
example, a report by the Federation of American Scientists detailed the costs and 
specifications of four major mobile SATCOM service providers.  The terminal costs 
ranged from $750 to $2500—over a threefold cost differential.  The “per minute” usage 
costs ranged from $0.60 to $3.00—a fivefold increase from lowest to highest (Federation 
of American Scientists, 2008). 
One of the single largest factors in determining the cost of procuring commercial 
SATCOM lies in the manner in which the government acquires the services.  As 
described in recent GAO reports and other documents, part of the reason commercial 
SATCOM services tend to be expensive is because the DoD has historically procured it 
in an inefficient manner.  For example, one vendor cites that a transponder lease costs 
$200,000 per month on a five-year lease and $330,000 per month on a one-year lease.  
With its historical tendency towards shorter term leases, the military is paying 65% more 
per month (Lacy, 2001).  DISA and GAO report significant progress in procurement 
efficiencies, as reported in section II of this thesis, but room for progress remains.   
As discussed in the technical measures of effectiveness section, pre-launch 
commitments to commercial satellite could yield not only superior technical solutions, 
but also cost savings through long-term, pre-negotiated rates.  This has appeal not only 
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from the government perspective, but was also a concept widely embraced by industry 
during a  study in the year 2000 which the Global Information Grid Commercial 
SATCOM Working Group (GIG CSWG) solicited industry opinions on potential military 
procurement strategies for commercial SATCOM.  In fact, the “anchor tenancy” 
approach was “liked” by 66% of vendors (the highest of any option) and deemed “best 
strategy” by 33% (again, the highest of any option).  One member remarked that this 
paradigm would have the greatest potential to give the government the “best deal 
possible” (Lacy, 2001). 
Seeing the results of the WGS cost estimate in which commercial SATCOM 
leases were 400% more expensive, one might wonder why commercial SATCOM should 
even be considered.  It is important to remember that the WGS cost/benefit analysis was 
conducted and presented by Boeing (a builder of SATCOM satellites), at a time when the 
government was considering procuring additional satellites nonetheless.  Similarly, 
Intelsat (a leaser of SATCOM) performed a similar cost/benefit analysis—taking into 
account satellite costs, launch costs, operations, fill rates, commercial pricing, and risk—
and came to the opposite conclusion: that commercial SATCOM leasing is the cheaper 
solution (DalBello, 2007).  If the government looks to industry to provide an answer to 
the “which is cheaper” question, industry will invariably use or exclude numbers to reach 
the conclusion that is good for their business.  The government needs a truly independent 
cost/benefit analysis of the situation and based on the literature review conducted for this 
thesis, no such analysis exists. 
D. POLICY COMPLIANCE 
While SATCOM policy exists at DoD and lower levels, the overarching policy is 
contained at the federal level in the U.S. National Space Policy.  The MILSATCOM ICD 
has yet to adapt to the most current version of the U.S. National Space Policy 
compliance.  The U.S. National Space Policy as authorized by President George W. Bush 
on August 31, 2006, provides direction that is clearly applicable to the SATCOM.  In 
paragraph 7 (Commercial Space Guidelines), it states, “departments and agencies shall 
use U.S. commercial space capabilities and services to the maximum practical extent; 
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purchase commercial capabilities and services when they are available in the commercial 
marketplace and meet United States Government requirements; and modify commercially 
available capabilities and services to meet those United States Government requirements 
when the modification is cost effective.”   
The above guidance, logically extrapolated to DoD SATCOM needs, implies that 
nearly all military wideband and narrowband requirements should be met under these 
provisions.  However, valid counterarguments can certainly be posed.  For example, the 
policy advocated use of “U.S. commercial space capabilities” and, as seen in section III 
of this thesis, many of the current SATCOM providers are international in their 
ownership and management.  Targeting strictly U.S. corporations for SATCOM service is 
at least initially limiting.  Additionally, it could be argued that the “meet United States 
Government requirements” clause support greater MILSATCOM development since 
commercial companies do not at present fulfill military security and technical 
requirements. 
E. SUMMARY 
Having analyzed the technical, costs, and policy measures, the complexity of the 
issue should be clear.  Neither commercial nor military SATCOM possesses a monopoly 
on technical, cost, or policy superiority.  Arriving at an optimal balance is as much an art 
as a science.  In the next section, this thesis will attempt to apply this art by evaluating the 
measures of this section against the various options for meeting military SATCOM 
requirements. 
 51
V. GETTING THE BALANCE RIGHT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In a 2002 issue of The Edge, the editor writes, “The conundrum faced by the DoD 
SATCOM community at large can be summed up as whether to lease or whether to buy 
SATCOM capability” (MITRE, 2002).  This assessment is flawed in its assumption that 
the DoD must do one or the other; the options are not mutually exclusive.  The real 
conundrum faced by the DoD SATCOM community is what is the appropriate balance.  
This challenge is recognized by both government and industry leaders.  As Rebecca 
Cowen-Hirsch, director for DISA’s SATCOM, Teleport & Services Program Executive 
Office, stated, “…with the launching of the Wideband Global Satellites we will begin to 
see a greater balance between MILSATCOM and commercial SATCOM, but we will still 
have a continued dependence and reliance on commercial SATCOM for the future” (Via 
Satellite, 2007).  The vice-president of government affairs at Intelsat writes that both 
government and industry need to “tackle the truly hard job of creating a communications 
satellite procurement approach that most cost effectively meets the needs of our military 
commanders and troops in the field” (DalBello, 2007).  Both sides of the fence are clearly 
struggling with the issue of optimal balance. 
What then is the current policy on balancing commercial SATCOM and 
MILSATCOM?  There does not appear to be one.  The   MILSATCOM ICD states 
“commercial systems augment USG-owned SATCOM in many areas and are an 
important constituent of worldwide capacity that supports the GIG infrastructure’s users,” 
yet there is no attempt to define the degree of augmentation.  Presumably, commercial 
augmentation in this context could be defined as fulfilling the delta between 
MILSATCOM supply and military SATCOM demand.  (However, one could argue that in 
the current 80/20 commercial/military SATCOM balance, it is actually the 
MILSATCOM that is augmenting the commercial SATCOM!)  No definition beyond this 
inferred one was found during the literature review conducted for this thesis.  As one 
observer writes, “How should the U.S. Department of Defense determine what traffic 
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goes on the nation’s military satellites and what goes on the commercial?  Is it something 
that should be planned?  Or should it remain, as it is today, a more or less fluid process 
involving the hopeful convergence of military demands, commercial supply, and the 
availability of operation and maintenance dollars for leasing?” (DalBello, 2007). 
Thus the objective of this thesis is to attempt to define what has never been 
officially defined: the appropriate balance between military SATCOM and commercial 
SATCOM.  The remainder of this section described the options available and compares 
them against the measures of effectiveness (technical, cost, and policy-compliance) from 
the previous section.   
B. SATCOM OPTIONS 
1. 100% Military SATCOM Policy 
One possibility to meeting DoD SATCOM requirements is to cease relying on 
commercial SATCOM altogether and leverage a 100% MILSATCOM solution.  An 
extreme solution, this would require an enormous acquisition investment.  It would be 
theoretically feasible if one imagines littering the skies with AEHF, MUOS, and 
especially WGS satellites.  However, such a policy would allow little or no ability to 
“surge” beyond what is immediately available through MILSATCOM; any ability to 
surge would have to be built into the constellation.   
While such a policy could meet the technical MOE, it would likely fail the cost 
MOE and would surely flunk the policy MOE.  Such an approach is a clear violation of 
the 2006 U.S. National Space Policy and would furthermore severely limit DoD ability to 








100% MILSATCOM Comments 
Technical G With sufficient funding and lead time, 
all technical requirements likely to be 
met. 
Cost Y Capability to surge is very limited and 
would need to be "built in" to 
MILSATCOM. This option is likely to be 
costly. 
Policy R Does not comply with U.S. National 
Space Policy 
Table 15.   100% MILSATCOM Assessment 
 
2. 100% Commercial SATCOM Policy 
A similarly extreme policy would be 100% reliance on commercial SATCOM 
services.  With long-term planning and well-crafted partnering, such a policy could work 
well for the vast majority of wideband and narrowband requirements.  However, turning 
over protected SATCOM requirements to commercial vendors would likely violate 
information assurance KPP of the technical MOE.  The cost of addressing advanced 
technical and protected requirements through such a mechanism is also a significant risk.  
While this paradigm fully embraces the “use commercial” thrust of the U.S. National 
Space Policy, it does not comply full with security policies. 
 
100% Commercial Comments 
Technical R With sufficient funding, partnering, and 
lead time, most technical requirements 
likely to be met.  Information assurance 
KPP likely violated. 
Cost Y Cost is highly uncertain for advanced 
and protected capabilities. 
Policy Y Supports leveraging commercial 
capabilities as described in U.S. 
National Space Policy. 




3. Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Paradigm 
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is an arrangement by which U.S. airline 
companies voluntarily contract to allow their civil aircraft to be used to support DoD 
mobility needs in time of emergency.  Although the program has existed since 1952, it 
was only been used once (in support of Desert Shield/Storm requirements).  The 
paradigm is widely known in the defense environment and subsequently it is frequently 
suggested that commercial satellite companies could enter into a similar arrange—a sort 
of Civil Reserve SATCOM Fleet (CRSF).    In the paper Commercial Communications 
Analogy to Civil Reserve Air Fleet, the authors propose almost precisely this (Dobbs, 
1999). 
While CRAF has proved relatively successful, perhaps more as an insurance 
policy than in actual practice given its one-time use, applying the same principle to 
SATCOM is more challenging.  In the 2001 Aerospace Corporation report prepared by 
Dr. Robert Lacy, there are strong indications that industry is unsupportive of this 
approach due to the long-term nature of SATCOM contracts and the type of customers 
using SATCOM.  As the author points out, airline customers are accustomed to being 
bumped off flights; however, businesses relying on their long-term SATCOM contracts 
for their livelihood are unlikely to be as forgiving or accommodating (Lacy, 2001).  It 
would likely take a tremendous financial incentive to convince SATCOM providers to 
participate in such a CRAF-like program. 
 
CRAF Paradigm Comments 
Technical Y Would partially address technical 
requirements. 
Cost Y Cost to incentivize contractors to 
participate could be prohibitive. 
Policy G Supports leveraging commercial 
capabilities as described in U.S. 
National Space Policy. 
Table 17.   CRAF Paradigm Assessment 
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4. Depot 50/50 Paradigm 
Though not suggested anywhere outside this thesis to the author’s knowledge, 
another paradigm that could be applied to the question of SATCOM commercial/military 
balance is the “50/50 rule” levied upon depot maintenance.  Under 10 United States Code 
(U.S.C.) 2466, the military departments and defense agencies can use no more than 50% 
of annual depot maintenance funding for work performed by private sector contractors.  
The point of this law is to ensure that the military is not overly dependant upon the 
private sector in the maintenance of their weapon systems.  A similar policy could state 
no more than 50% of SATCOM used by the military should come from commercial 
sources.  As a general target, this policy provides guidance to increase MILSATCOM 
capacity and could “ease the minds” of those who believe the military is overly 
dependant what is often perceived to be unsecure, precarious, and costly commercial 
SATCOM.  On the other hand, the number is arbitrary and could limit ability to meet 
SATCOM requirements during operations if strictly enforced.   
Depot 50/50 Paradigm Comments 
Technical G Addresses technical requirements 
provided MILSATCOM is appropriately 
expanded to ensure compliance with 
50/50 rule. 
Cost G Increases cost of MILSATCOM, 
reduces cost of commercial SATCOM 
during periods of heightened 
operations. 
Policy Y Does not fully support maximum 
leveraging of commercial sources as 
described in U.S. National Space 
Policy. 
Table 18.   Depot 50/50 Paradigm Assessment 
 
5. Optimized Hybrid 
From assessments of the first two options described in this section, it is clear that 
neither 100% MILSATCOM nor 100% commercial SATCOM is optimal.  A hybrid is 
needed to “go green” in all three measures of effectiveness.  This proposed option seeks 
to do the following:  
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• Maximize technical compliance by (1) allocating protected and advanced 
technology requirements to MILSATCOM and (2) allocating proven 
wideband and narrowband requirements to commercial SATCOM via 
long-term anchor tenancy arrangements. 
• Maximize cost-effectiveness on commercial SATCOM through anchor 
tenancy, “most favored buyer” arrangements, and long-term leases. 
• Maximize policy compliance by favoring U.S.-owned companies for the 
vast of majority commercial wideband and narrowband SATCOM leases.  
While U.S.-based SATCOM companies are presently limited, this policy 
would foster greater U.S. corporate investment. 
 
Optimized Hybrid Comments 
Technical G With sufficient funding and lead time, 
all technical requirements likely to be 
met.  Methodical, vice ad hoc, 
partnering with industry improves 
likelihood of achieving technical 
requirements. 
Cost G Reduces cost of commercial SATCOM 
through increasing buying power and 
enabling long-term leases.  The more 
methodical and long-term approach in 
this arrangement puts the U.S. 
government in an improved buying 
position. 
Policy G Fully supports maximum leveraging of 
commercial sources as described in 
U.S. National Space Policy. 
Table 19.   Optimized Hybrid Assessment 
One could argue that this hybrid with commercial SATCOM emphasis is, in 
reality, not wildly different than what exists today in that it resembles the current 80/20 
commercial/military SATCOM mix.  However, there are two important differences from 
the status quo.  One, this policy would effectively negate future military wideband and 
narrowband SATCOM programs (i.e., no next generation WGS or MUOS).  Second, the 
deliberate nature of this policy has dramatic implications for government partnering with 
industry.  Instead of being short term post-launch customers who purchase what is 
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available as needed, the military would become long-term customers/investors with a 
voice in the technical requirements.  If executed wisely, this relationship could yield both 
cost savings and technical advantages, such as improved terminal interoperability and 
desired frequency availability. 
 Another objection to this paradigm is that hosting such a large proportion of 
military traffic on commercial SATCOM is the security vulnerability.  However, the risk 
is no greater than the status quo in which 80% of Operation Iraqi Freedom SATCOM 
traffic is commercial.  This hybrid paradigm, in which the DoD injects itself into the 
commercial SATCOM design process, actually could substantially reduce this risk by 
planning, designing, and funding more robust anti-jam capabilities.   
C. SUMMARY 
This section surveyed five options for obtaining the proper balance between 
MILSATCOM and commercial SATCOM.  From the analysis, it is seen that there are 
viable options that satisfy most MOEs (Depot 50/50 Paradigm) and that one option that 
satisfies all MOEs (Optimized Hybrid).  The optimized hybrid brings optimizes technical 
requirements compliance by allocating inherently military SATCOM (protected and 
advanced technology) to MILSATCOM while designating commercial sources for 
proven, broad SATCOM requirements.  It provides cost optimization through a more 
strategic, less ad hoc partnership with industry.  Finally, it satisfies U.S. Space Policy 
through use of the commercial satellite industry to the maximum extent possible.  The 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
As seen in the previous section, only the Optimized Hybrid military/commercial 
SATCOM paradigm is rated as green in all three measures (technical, cost, and policy).  
This option is the primary recommendation of this thesis, although the Depot 50/50 
Paradigm also scored relatively high.  The following figure depicts how commercial 
SATCOM is better leveraged under the new paradigm versus the current hybrid.  
 
Current SATCOM Hybrid Proposed SATCOM Hybrid
• Ad Hoc Planning
• Post-launch customer
• No say in design
• Short Lease Emphasis
• Limited Military Freqs
• Deliberate Planning
• Pre-launch customer
• Limited say in design
• Long Lease Emphasis
• Expanded Military Freqs
THE POTENTIAL OF PROPOSED HYBRID:
• Improved ability to meet technical requirements through early 
involvement with industry
• Lower cost through early investment, most favored customer 
rates, and long-term leases
• Fuller compliance with National Space Policy which mandates 
maximum use of commercial satellite resources
 
Figure 25.   Commercial SATCOM Under Proposed SATCOM Hybrid 
 
The most significant commercial SATCOM shift is from ad hoc planning to 
deliberate planning.  The move from hopeful convergence and vague policy to strategic 
partnering and defined policy is the key enabler for remaining shifts and benefits listed 
above.  It allows the government to be a pre-launch customer with a say in planning that 
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allows requirements to be better met.  It builds on recent DISA cost and responsiveness 
improvements by making the military a larger customer with discounted leases and a 
greater long-term stake in commercial satellite ventures.   
To make this option a viable and successful reality, several “sub-
recommendations” are required. 
B. FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Conduct Independent Cost/Benefit Analysis 
As described in Chapter IV of this thesis, very few “pure” and comprehensive 
analyses have been done comparing military and commercial SATCOM.  Specifically, 
estimates have come from biased sources, key cost factors have been excluded, and 
commercial leasing costs have been based on inefficient procurement practices.  A 
thorough and definitive cost/benefit analysis from an independent source should be 
conducted so that decision-makers can make a more informed long-term policy decision.  
2. Explore Anchor Tenancy 
While the Optimized Hybrid policy could be pursued without anchor tenancy, this 
author contends that implementing this concept is the cornerstone to successful 
partnerships with industry in better meeting DoD requirements.  Anchor tenancy is 
essentially a financial commitment during the development phase of a product that 
enables the viability of the project.  In other words, it is a way for the government to 
financially and contractually say, “If you build it, we will come.”  Without such 
arrangements, industry will be wary of taking risks to meet theoretical government needs.  
Investors require some degree of guarantee of return on their investment, especially in the 
space business where many risk-takers of the last ten years have not been rewarded.  As 
discussed in section V of this thesis, there is significant industry enthusiasm for this 
concept (Lacy, 2001).  In addition to being a win for industry, this concept can enable 
better prices, greater design influence to improve security and protection, and limited 
financial risk for the government. 
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There is likely to be some resistance to anchor tenancy due to perceived violation 
of acquisition policies and federal statutes.  However, there are provisions for such 
arrangements in Title 15, Chapter 84 of the U.S.C., which described “an arrangement in 
which the United States Government agrees to procure sufficient quantities of a 
commercial space product or service needed to meet government mission requirement so 
that a commercial venture is made viable.”  There is also precedent for the concept via 
the two-year contract between the DoD and Iridium as signed in December 2000 (Lacy, 
2001). 
3. Establish Explicit DoD Policy 
It is the recommendation of this thesis that the Optimized Hybrid paradigm, with 
its emphasis on strategic partnering with industry for the majority of requirements, be 
incorporated into DoD policy.  Not only does it provide advantages in technical and 
financial areas, but it also moves the DoD into alignment with the current U.S. National 
Space Policy.  In addition to the risk of non-compliance with national policy, the current 
ad hoc nature of the military/commercial SATCOM balance is optimal for none of the 
measures of effectiveness.  Without a defined policy to march toward, effective planning 
is extremely difficult for the government and industry.   
4. Modify Acquisition Strategy to Fit Policy 
Clearly, such a policy cannot be immediately implemented into DoD acquisition 
and procurement activities.  It will take time to develop corresponding contractual 
arrangements with industry and naturally time to develop then launch the appropriate 
satellites.  Also, the next generation of wideband, narrowband, and protected 
MILSATCOM (WGS, MUOS, and AEHF) is well underway and it would not be prudent 
in any way to “pull the plug” on such programs in light of their current progress.  This 
policy is necessarily long-term—applicable to the next “next generation” in 2025 and 
beyond. 
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C. SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
In addition to exploring the further recommendations described above, the author 
recommends the following areas for further study: 
1. Analyze Bandwidth Reduction 
Military bandwidth requirements are increasing at a near exponential rate, akin to 
Moore’s Law as seen in section II of this thesis.  While there is ample literature and 
discussion regarding how to increase the supply, there is virtually no literature or 
discussion on how to reduce the demand.  A comprehensive “bandwidth reduction 
initiative” could be instituted across the DoD and dramatically reduce SATCOM usage.  
This initiative could address both system bandwidth use (i.e., designing UAVs that 
require less bandwidth) and personnel bandwidth use (i.e., limiting non-essential network 
use).   
2. Explore SATCOM Alternatives 
While SATCOM is often considered to be economical long-distance 
communications, it is not in many situations the most economical nor the most optimal.  
For example, fiber surpasses SATCOM in terms of cost and is clearly favored for 
communications in developed areas.  Also, for undeveloped areas where the military does 
not already have SATCOM presence, leveraging near-space communication balloons or a 
communication-enabled UAV could be far more responsive and cost-effective.  The 
bottom-line is that SATCOM is only one of many supply options available for 
operational communications and other viable options exist for meeting the demand. 
D. SUMMARY 
From its experimental beginning in the later 1950s to its operational coming-of-
age in Desert Storm to its recent explosion of use in Operation Iraqi Freedom, SATCOM 
has grown to become an indispensible force enabler for the warfighter.  As the need for 
SATCOM has grown, reliance on commercial SATCOM has grown along with it at an 
often alarming rate.  However, in this growth, the maturity of policy and planning 
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wisdom has often been lacking.  Recent attention from Congress and the GAO has 
improved commercial SATCOM procurement, but these improvements were reactionary 
and tactical in nature.  What is needed now are improvements that are proactive and 
strategic.  
Military use of commercial SATCOM will continue to be critical to operations 
and this criticality demands that certain questions be answered.  For example, will 
commercial SATCOM be procured in long-term, methodical manner or will it be 
purchased on as as-needed, just-in-time basis?  Will the DoD fully embrace the 
commercial emphasis of the U.S. National Space Policy?  If commercial SATCOM usage 
is out of balance, what is the right balance?  Whatever the answers to these questions, 
they should be answered in a clear and transparent manner for all government and 
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